I suddenly remembered what I knew all along
Gregg Easterbrook:
"...Richard Clarke's headline-making volume of self-praise might as well be titled, I've Suddenly Remembered I Knew It All Along. As yours truly noted yesterday (just scroll down), Clarke now claims he knew after September 11 it would be a colossal mistake to pursue Al Qaeda and attack Iraq simultaneously. I asked, Why didn't he say so at the time? Clarke left government about a month before the assault on Iraq began. This means he had plenty of time to speak out, as a private citizen, against the Iraq attack--and at that moment, an antiwar statement by the president's own counterterrorism advisor would have had tremendous impact worldwide. Instead in the month before the Iraq war began, Clarke did not oppose it. Suddenly in 2004 he has remembered his intense antiwar views--now that the political climate has shifted and suddenly remembering your intense antiwar views is a good way to sell a book.
"But maybe in the month before the Iraq war, Clarke had decided to hold his tongue and say nothing about his former job? Um, not exactly. As New Republic super-intern Anne O'Donnell points out, on resigning from the National Security Council in February 2003, one month prior to the attack on Iraq, Clarke quickly signed as an on-air consultant to ABC News. During the month before the war, Clarke made several appearances on national television. He spoke in great detail regarding Iraq, Saddam, terrorism intelligence, military tactics, even discussing by name individual Republican Guard divisions and U.S. plans for those divisions. So Clarke certainly wasn't holding his tongue, he was yakking nonstop. And yet by the most amazing and astonishing coincidence, Clarke apparently didn't mention any of the strongly-held antiwar views he has now suddenly remembered!"
Defeating asymetrical warfare
Clarke's postion that the US is too weak to fight al Qaeda and Iraq at the same time shows a lack of historical knowledge on a grand scale. The US is significantly stronger economically and militarily now than it was in 1941 when it was coming out of a depression. In World War II our major ally was the Brits. France was already defeated. We took and defeated two first rate powers Germany and Japan, both infinitely more powerful than al Qaeda or Iraq. To suggest that the US is not strong enough to to take on two second or third rate powers implies that the Clinton cuts in the military were more significant than even conservatives believe.
He also loses site of the opportunity to impose a strategic defeat on the terrorist by defeating the weak insurgency in Iraq. Terrorist use asymetrical warfare because they are too weak to use a more effective strategy. The insurgency in Iraq is especcially weak though occassionally deadly. It has shown no capacity to make militarily significant attacks. To be militarily significan, an attack must be able to effect the ability of the coalition to operate militarily. At this point the insurgents are mostly avoiding military targets and focusing on civilians and infrastructure. This undermines one of the other essential ingrediants of a successful insurgency, because it makes it less likely that the population will join them in a general uprising.
Gregg Easterbrook:
"...Richard Clarke's headline-making volume of self-praise might as well be titled, I've Suddenly Remembered I Knew It All Along. As yours truly noted yesterday (just scroll down), Clarke now claims he knew after September 11 it would be a colossal mistake to pursue Al Qaeda and attack Iraq simultaneously. I asked, Why didn't he say so at the time? Clarke left government about a month before the assault on Iraq began. This means he had plenty of time to speak out, as a private citizen, against the Iraq attack--and at that moment, an antiwar statement by the president's own counterterrorism advisor would have had tremendous impact worldwide. Instead in the month before the Iraq war began, Clarke did not oppose it. Suddenly in 2004 he has remembered his intense antiwar views--now that the political climate has shifted and suddenly remembering your intense antiwar views is a good way to sell a book.
"But maybe in the month before the Iraq war, Clarke had decided to hold his tongue and say nothing about his former job? Um, not exactly. As New Republic super-intern Anne O'Donnell points out, on resigning from the National Security Council in February 2003, one month prior to the attack on Iraq, Clarke quickly signed as an on-air consultant to ABC News. During the month before the war, Clarke made several appearances on national television. He spoke in great detail regarding Iraq, Saddam, terrorism intelligence, military tactics, even discussing by name individual Republican Guard divisions and U.S. plans for those divisions. So Clarke certainly wasn't holding his tongue, he was yakking nonstop. And yet by the most amazing and astonishing coincidence, Clarke apparently didn't mention any of the strongly-held antiwar views he has now suddenly remembered!"
Defeating asymetrical warfare
Clarke's postion that the US is too weak to fight al Qaeda and Iraq at the same time shows a lack of historical knowledge on a grand scale. The US is significantly stronger economically and militarily now than it was in 1941 when it was coming out of a depression. In World War II our major ally was the Brits. France was already defeated. We took and defeated two first rate powers Germany and Japan, both infinitely more powerful than al Qaeda or Iraq. To suggest that the US is not strong enough to to take on two second or third rate powers implies that the Clinton cuts in the military were more significant than even conservatives believe.
He also loses site of the opportunity to impose a strategic defeat on the terrorist by defeating the weak insurgency in Iraq. Terrorist use asymetrical warfare because they are too weak to use a more effective strategy. The insurgency in Iraq is especcially weak though occassionally deadly. It has shown no capacity to make militarily significant attacks. To be militarily significan, an attack must be able to effect the ability of the coalition to operate militarily. At this point the insurgents are mostly avoiding military targets and focusing on civilians and infrastructure. This undermines one of the other essential ingrediants of a successful insurgency, because it makes it less likely that the population will join them in a general uprising.
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